USA v. Dextrick Lawton by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-11-2016 
USA v. Dextrick Lawton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Dextrick Lawton" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 21. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/21 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-2887 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DEXTRICK LAWTON, 
       Appellant 
__________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-12-cr-00295-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Gustave Diamond 
__________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 8, 2015 
 
Before: VANASKIE, NYGAARD, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 11, 2016) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 
 Appellant Dextrick Lawton entered a negotiated plea of guilty to conspiracy to 
distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin in violation 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and signed a waiver of appellate rights in connection with his plea.  
Before sentencing, he sought to withdraw his plea on the ground that it was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  The District Court denied Lawton’s motion and imposed the 
agreed-upon sentence of 180 months (15 years) of incarceration and 5 years of supervised 
release.  After Lawton appealed, the Government moved to enforce the appellate waiver.  
For the reasons that follow, we will enforce the waiver and dismiss the appeal. 
I.  
 In November 2012, Lawton and three codefendants were indicted by a federal 
grand jury for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram 
or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  The parties began plea negotiations 
not long after indictment.  The Government contended that Lawton would face an 
enhanced offense level for being a supervisor or manager, but would receive a reduction 
for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in an adjusted offense level of 32.  Prior state-
court convictions for drugs and firearms led to a criminal history category of III.  This 
resulted in an advisory guidelines range of 151 to 188 months. 
 During plea negotiations, the Government suggested that Lawton faced two 
additional increases to any potential sentence.  First, Lawton had a prior felony 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance, which, upon filing of an information 
by the Government, would have doubled Lawton’s mandatory minimum sentence from 
10 to 20 years under 21 U.S.C. § 851.  Second, the Government contended that on one 
occasion, Lawton delivered heroin by way of an associate to a user named Brian Smith, 
3 
 
who ultimately died from a combination of overdose and choking on food.  The 
combination of Lawton’s prior felony narcotics conviction and delivery of heroin that 
resulted in death would have resulted in mandatory life imprisonment.  See 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1)(A)(i).  As part of a negotiated plea, the Government agreed to forego these 
enhancements and recommend a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. 
 On October 15, 2013, Lawton filed a pro se motion for the replacement of his 
court-appointed counsel, Michael Moser.  On October 22, the District Court conducted a 
hearing and accepted Lawton’s representation that they were not “see[ing] eye to eye,” 
App. 78.  In response to Lawton’s motion, however, the Government said that it would 
construe Moser’s dismissal as a rejection of the pending plea offer, which might lead to 
the filing of an information under § 851 and a superseding indictment adding charges 
relating to Smith’s death.  Over Lawton’s objection, the Court agreed that the 
Government retained the right to withdraw a plea offer at any time.  Lawton then 
conferred privately with counsel, after which he agreed to accept the plea offer and 
withdraw his motion to dismiss Moser. 
 Six weeks later, on December 4, Lawton, still represented by Moser, pleaded 
guilty under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) in exchange for the negotiated sentence of 15 
years’ imprisonment.  As part of the plea colloquy, both Lawton and Moser affirmatively 
agreed that Lawton’s plea of guilty was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  He also 
agreed orally and in writing to a limited waiver of his appellate rights, which permitted 
him to appeal only if (1) the Government appealed; (2) the sentence exceeded the 
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applicable statutory limits; or (3) the sentence unreasonably exceeded the advisory 
Guidelines range. 
 This appeal turns largely on instances during the plea colloquy when Lawton 
raised questions with respect to the substance of the Government’s evidence against him.  
First, Lawton put the following inquiry to the Court: 
THE DEFENDANT: [A]s far as the evidence, is there, like, 
something else, like a package I was supposed to get? 
THE COURT: I’m sorry? 
THE DEFENDANT: Is there, like, a package I’m supposed to 
have with the evidence? 
THE COURT: No, there was no package you were supposed 
to have.  There was certain evidence that the Government was 
required to produce for your lawyer at some earlier time.  I 
presume that that’s been done under the Rule 12 rules.  But 
the Government doesn’t have to produce all of its evidence in 
advance of trial. 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand that.   
App. 98–99.  Moments later, the following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: You received a copy of the indictment in this 
case, and you have had an opportunity— 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: You have not received a copy of the 
indictment in this case? 
THE DEFENDANT: No.  I never had.  The only thing I ever 
had between myself and my lawyer is pretty much explaining 
what a conspiracy is.  I never had any paperwork or any— 
THE COURT: You have had an opportunity to discuss the 
charges that are against you with your lawyer? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: So that you know that what you’re charged 
with in this case is from September 2010 to on or about 
January 2012, that you conspired with certain other 
individuals named and others both known and unknown to the 
Grand Jury to distribute and possess with the intent to 
distribute one kilogram or more of a mixture and substance 
containing a detectable amount of heroin.  Do you understand 
that’s what you’re charged with in this case? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
App. 100–01. 
 Shortly thereafter, the Government explained that, at trial, the proof would 
demonstrate that Lawton served as a co-conspirator in a large-scale drug ring in which 
“Lawton’s role was to distribute heroin to the hotel rooms, to collect money from the sold 
heroin, and to otherwise assist the heroin distribution operations.”  App. 111.  The 
Government added that it intended to present “evidence of a number of controlled 
purchases of heroin during the course of the conspiracy, along with other seizures of 
heroin[,] . . . laboratory analysis confirming that the substances seized and obtained were 
in fact heroin[,] . . . [and] witness testimony confirming Lawton’s role in the  
conspiracy.”  Id.  This led to the following exchange: 
THE COURT: You heard the Government’s summary of the 
evidence in the case as it pertains to you.  Is that accurate? 
THE DEFENDANT: As far as my role, no.  I was never 
presented with none of that.  What she just said I never heard 
that before. 
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THE COURT: You don’t have to hear that before.  This is the 
Government’s statement as to what they will be able to prove 
in the case as it pertains to you. Is that an accurate statement? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Anything else in that regard? 
MR. MOSER: Nothing, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Still your desire to plead guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
App. 111–12.  Neither Lawton nor Moser raised any further objection during the plea 
colloquy that day. 
 On December 13, 2014, still prior to sentencing, Moser moved to withdraw as 
counsel because “[w]hen the change of plea happened . . . with respect to the factual 
recitation, Mr. Lawton was in distress.  There may be a question as to whether or not I 
should have shut that down . . . .”  App. 117.  But because Moser could not assist in the 
filing of a motion predicated in part on his own ineffectiveness, he was obliged to 
withdraw.  The Court granted the motion, after which Lawton, with the assistance of new 
counsel, moved to withdraw his plea under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.1  The Court denied the motion without a hearing. 
 On May 21, 2014, at sentencing, Lawton reiterated his desire to withdraw his 
guilty plea.  He informed the Court that he had misunderstood the plea process, that he 
                                              
1 Rule 11 provides that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea before imposition 
of sentence if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the 
withdrawal.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). 
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never received discovery, that he had tried to ask the Court questions about the process 
but was rebuffed, that he never oversaw the distribution of drugs or sold drugs, and that 
Moser had misinformed him by telling him he could face life imprisonment in the 
absence of a plea.  The District Court declined to revisit its ruling on the motion to 
withdraw, and sentenced Lawton to the agreed-upon term of 15 years’ imprisonment and 
5 years of supervised release.   
After pronouncing the sentence, the Court heard from Lawton’s mother.  In 
response to her plea for leniency, the Court informed her as follows: 
Now, he has a certain right to appeal.  If I was wrong in 
refusing to permit him to withdraw his plea, it will come 
back, but I’m not sure that it will come back to his benefit 
because unless the government loses all of the witnesses that 
it has, the chances are that he will still be convicted after a 
trial, but that’s pure speculation on my part.  You understand 
he does have a limited right to appeal and he can appeal my 
ruling with regard to his motion to withdraw a sentence and 
plea. 
App. 139.  Lawton filed a timely appeal. 
II.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III.  
 The Government argues that we should enforce the waiver of appeal and dismiss 
this matter for lack of jurisdiction.  In assessing whether to enforce a waiver of appeal, 
we must consider: (1) the scope of the waiver and whether it bars appellate review of the 
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issue presented by the defendant; (2) whether the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver works a miscarriage of justice.  United 
States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 243–44 (3d Cir. 2008). 
A.  
 Lawton first argues that this appeal falls outside the scope of the waiver because of 
the District Court’s comments to Lawton’s mother after announcing sentence—namely, 
its unsolicited remark that Lawton “does have a limited right to appeal and he can appeal 
my ruling with regard to his motion to withdraw a sentence and plea.”  App. 139.  To be 
sure, these remarks were at odds with the text of the earlier waiver, but they are not 
controlling.  The question is what the defendant understood at the time of the plea 
colloquy.  See United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 930 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).  Statements 
by a district court at sentencing, even if contrary to an earlier waiver of appeal, do not 
affect the waiver’s scope because “‘no justifiable reliance has been placed by the 
defendant on such advice.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Liriano-Blanco, 510 F.3d 168, 
173 (2d Cir. 2007)).  Here, Lawton agreed to a waiver of appeal at the time of his plea, 
and the District Court’s subsequent remarks to the contrary had no effect on the validity 
or scope of that waiver.  Because this appeal does not implicate any of the three 
aforementioned exceptions contained in the waiver, we conclude that the appeal falls 
within the waiver’s scope. 
B.  
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 Next, Lawton submits that his waiver of appellate rights was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  We analyze that claim by “scrutiniz[ing] the colloquy” to 
determine whether “the district court ‘inform[ed] the defendant of, and determine[d] that 
the defendant underst[ood] . . . the terms’” of the waiver.  United States v. Mabry, 536 
F.3d 231, 238-39 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N)).  We have 
uniformly upheld the validity of appellate waivers where the district court engaged in an 
appropriate plea colloquy under Rule 11.  See id.; United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 
200, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 
2006); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 Here, Lawton affirmed that he was of sound mind at the time of the plea, that he 
was satisfied with Moser’s performance as his attorney, and that he was pleading guilty 
knowingly and voluntarily.  It is true, as we detailed above, that he at times asked 
questions and expressed dissatisfaction with the Government’s production of discovery 
and its expected proof at trial.  Nonetheless, after each such instance, he accepted the 
District Court’s accurate explanation of his rights and reaffirmed his continuing desire to 
plead guilty.  This is unsurprising, given that Lawton’s objection to the recited facts 
appears to have been limited to the specific allegation that he participated in the 
distribution of heroin from hotel rooms.  As he acknowledged by his plea of guilty, and 
as he further clarified in his briefing, see Lawton’s Br. at 38, he did not object to the 
Government’s contention that he committed the charged crime, that is, conspiracy to 
distribute heroin.  As to the appellate waiver in particular, the Court engaged in a lengthy 
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inquiry during which Lawton expressed no confusion and asked no questions.  As such, 
the transcript on its face would not permit a finding that the plea as a whole, or the waiver 
in particular, was unknowing or involuntary. 
 In response, Lawton offers a written statement from Moser, which comes in the 
form of a letter to Lawton’s current attorney written some four months after the change of 
plea.  Moser states that during the plea hearing, Lawton became distressed during the 
Government’s factual recitation, such that Moser pulled Lawton aside and conducted a 
lengthy off-the-record conversation with him.  Moser now in hindsight surmises that 
Lawton “may have been too upset and agitated to continue to proceed with a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary change of his plea to guilty.”  App. 47. 
 Moser’s account is belied by the official transcript of the proceedings, which does 
not reflect an interruption in the proceedings at the time Moser describes.  Nor does the 
record contain any other noteworthy expression of consternation or worry on Lawton’s 
part.  Instead the transcript reflects that the District Court “inform[ed] the defendant of, 
and determine[d] that the defendant underst[ood] . . . the terms’” of the waiver.  Mabry, 
536 F.3d at 239 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N)).  Under these circumstances, we 
see no basis on which to decline enforcement of the waiver.2 
                                              
2 Lawton also suggests that the plea was rendered involuntary based on unduly 
coercive plea-bargaining tactics by the Government, including its position that the offer 
would be withdrawn if Lawton pursued his motion for new counsel.  Lawton offers no 
legal support for this novel theory, and we agree with the District Court that in the 
absence of a promise to hold the offer open for a fixed period, the Government was free 
to withdraw its plea offer at any time. 
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 As an alternative ground, Lawton argues that his plea was involuntary because 
Moser was ineffective during plea negotiations.  See United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 
43 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[A] defendant has the right to make a reasonably informed decision 
whether to accept a plea offer.”).  Here, Moser presented Lawton with a choice between a 
negotiated 15-year sentence and the possibility of life imprisonment after trial.  Lawton 
now believes that the Government’s threat of an enhanced penalty under 21 U.S.C. § 851, 
though legally justified by Lawton’s criminal history, was contrary to Department of 
Justice policy.  He also contends that under Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 
(2014), the Government would not have been entitled to a sentencing enhancement under 
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i).  He believes that Moser erred in failing to identify these issues and 
bring them to his attention.  Our longstanding practice, however, is “to defer the issue of 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel to a collateral attack.”  United States v. Thornton, 327 
F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003).  We will follow that policy here, where the applicability of 
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i), the extent of Moser’s advice on its applicability, and the question of 
prejudice may turn on factual questions that are inappropriate for resolution at this 
juncture. 
C.  
 Finally, Lawton argues that enforcement of his appellate waiver would work a 
miscarriage of justice by preventing review of his claim of actual innocence.  Where a 
defendant seeks to withdraw a plea under Rule 11 based on actual innocence, the 
defendant’s burden is “substantial,” because “[b]ald assertions of innocence” are 
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insufficient, and must be “‘buttressed by facts in the record that support a claimed 
defense.’”  United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting United 
States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 818 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 Lawton, by his own admission, “has not asserted innocence of conspiracy to 
deliver heroin altogether.”  Lawton’s Br. at 38.  And indeed, he would be hard-pressed to 
support such a claim—the Government’s case was based on months of surveillance, 
controlled buys, cooperating witnesses, and recorded calls.  Instead, Lawton’s assertion 
of innocence is limited to the claim that he did not participate in a scheme to distribute 
heroin from hotel rooms, and had no role in Brian Smith’s death.  Because Lawton’s 
limited disagreement with the scope of his participation in the conspiracy falls well short 
of a claim of actual innocence of the crime to which he pleaded guilty, Lawton has failed 
to establish that enforcement of the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice. 
IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will enforce the waiver of appeal and dismiss the 
appeal. 
